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This paper explores the sources of firm-level scale economies in R&D, based on unique 
project-level data from a new large-scale survey of Japanese inventors, matched with firm- 
level data. We focus on four sources: complementary assets, internal and external knowledge 
inflows, and inventor team size. Major findings include: (1) a larger firm tends to generate 
more patents from a research project but not more valuable patents, controlling for the 
objectives and the R&D investment (inventive efforts) for the project; (2) the sales of a firm 
rather than its R&D (or patent stocks) significantly affects the number of patents from the 
project, suggesting that the main source of such scale economy is not internal knowledge 
inflow but “appropriation advantage” of a large firm; (3) an inventor in a large firm often gains 
important knowledge for the project from internal knowledge inflow as well as from scientific 
literature. However, the performance of R&D—for which internal knowledge is 
important—tends to be low; and (4) the size of inventor teams increases with firm size and 
technological diversity. A larger team size is significantly associated with higher patent value 
and, as such, the size of the inventor team is one source of firm-level scale economies. 
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This paper explores the sources of firm level scale economies in R&D by exploiting 
the newly collected detailed project level information. A pioneering study by Henderson and 
Cockburn (1996) demonstrated that there is significant economies of scale and scope at the 
firm level for drug discovery, even though there may look to exist a decreasing return in 
research on patent outputs at firm level data (see Henderson and Cockburn (2001)). That is, 
they have successfully identified firm level scale economy by exploiting project level 
information. This paper follows a similar strategy and explores the sources of scale and scope 
economies (for brevity we call “scale economies”) , focusing on complementary assets, 
internal and external knowledge inflows and inventor team size. There are three novel points in 
our empirical analysis. First, we aim at identifying both the scale economy in the R&D task 
itself and the appropriation advantage of a large firm, based on complementary assets. 
Although past studies often use patents as an output measure of R&D, they are actually the 
result of the choices by a firm as to seeking patent application vs. relying on secrecy or on 
defensive publication, so that patenting is endogenous. The studies such as by Hall and 
Ziedonis (2001) find that the patenting behavior of firm is more positively related with the size 
of tangible assets than with R&D investment, which might reflect the appropriation advantage 
of a large firm (or the defensive motivation against the risk of being held up). Thus, large 
firms’ apparent superior performance in patenting may not be due to its superior R&D 
performance but due to its advantage in appropriating the return from its inventions.   
  Second, we measure internal and external knowledge spillover to the R&D project 
directly, which will help us identifying how firm size may affect the strength of such 
knowledge inflows. One potentially important mechanism for scale advantage is internal 




and from past projects to current projects through accumulated internal knowledge stock (see 
for an example, Henderson and Cockburn (1996)) . The past studies attempted to measure the 
internal inflow indirectly by looking at how the performance of a R&D project is related to the 
current R&D at firm level and to the stocks of patent grants to the firm. However, such 
approach is vulnerable to the existence of uncontrolled technological opportunities or demand 
side shocks which affect the value of the entire R&D portfolio of a firm. Another important 
source of scale advantage of a large firm is its higher absorptive capability with respect to 
external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and Gambardella (1992)). The empirical 
studies also look at how the R&D performance of a firm is related to the patents and R&Ds of 
the other firms located closely in technological space (Jaffe (1986) and Henderson and 
Cockburn (1996)). However, such approach may also be vulnerable to the existence of 
uncontrolled technological opportunities or demand side shocks which affect all firms in the 
same technological sector. For an example, when an important scientific discovery becomes 
available, it will increase patenting across firms in the relevant technology field. We will use 
directly the inventor’s evaluation of the importance of knowledge inflows to the R&D project 
in order to mitigate this problem of measuring internal knowledge inflow. We will then assess 
how they are related to firm characteristics
2. 
  Third, we will assess how firm size matter as a determinant of inventor team size. As 
invention process becomes more complex, the number of co-inventors has increased (see Jones 
(2009)). Then, one potential important source of scale advantage of a firm is a larger pool of 
inventors within a firm, which can provide more variety of expertise and experiences. We will 
assess whether a large firm uses a larger inventor team for the same type of a research project 
and whether a larger size of inventors contributes to enhancing the research performance, 
                                                  
2  An alternative approach would be to use citation information, which is however subject to 
significant since substantial part of references are chosen by non-inventors such as examiners (see 




controlling for the total man months spent by the researchers of the project as a whole.   
For our analysis of project level data, it is important to specify the basic 
characteristics of R&D project in detail, since they are heterogeneous in terms of the objectives 
and the stages, the distributions of which can vary across firms. The project aiming at 
strengthening the competitiveness of the core business of a firm may be quite different from 
those for the project for developing new business or cultivating new technical seeds. The scope 
of an R&D project varies across firms. Some firms may engage in a fully integrated project, 
covering basic research to development, while the others may focus on a particular stage and 
outsource the other stages. Patenting propensity may differ between product innovation and 
process innovation. The input to the R&D process is also diverse: number of inventors, input 
of researcher time, calendar time and knowledge inflows.   
We use the data from the survey over Japanese inventors implemented in 2007, which 
provide performance data on the R&D project which yielded the focal patent as well as their 
detailed characteristics, in order to characterize R&D project in detail. The questionnaire 
identified not only the knowledge sources for the conception of the research project but also 
the business objectives of such project, its scope in the R&D stages and the type in terms of 
product development vs. process development
3. It identifies both the number of patents from 
the project as well as the economic value of the surveyed patent evaluated by the inventor 
himself as performance indicators. We also obtained a man-month measure for each project, in 
addition to the number of inventors. The project information has been matched to the 
firm-level financial and patent data for the applicant firms. We also constructed the patent 
stock data for listed firms (large firms). The dataset allows us to assess the effects of 
project-level and firm-level characteristics on the R&D performance, recognizing the 
heterogeneity of R&D projects.   
                                                  
3  Product innovation in the RIETI survey does not be limited to the drastic innovation replacing the 




The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides theoretical 
framework. Section 3 provides an explanation of the data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 
provides estimation models and section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 concludes 
and discusses the implications.   
 
2.  Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
2.1  A Model 
We consider the following simple model of R&D of a firm with an endogenous 
patenting decision. We denote the research objective and the research stage of an R&D project 
j by  j  (vector) and the importance of internal and external knowledge inflows to the 
conception of the project by  j    (vector). The combination of these two variables 
characterizes an R&D project. We then denote the size of complementarity assets of a firm by 
A  and the R&D supply side capability (such as firm-level knowledge stock, firm-level 
concurrent R&D, the absorptive capability and the size of the pool of inventors) by K. If the 
knowledge of the concurrent and past R&D projects can be profitably used for the current 
project, there is a firm scale economy (As shown Panzar and Willig (1981), the existence of 
shared input is the source for the economy of scope). We assume that the basic characteristics 
of an R&D project and the firm characteristics variables affect the level of knowledge inflow 
to the project.   
) , , ( j j j K f                          (1), 
where  j    is a stochastic variable.     
  Denoting the R&D effort by a firm for project j by  j x (the number of inventors and 




research project:   
) , , , ; ( j j j j j K x z z                     (2), 
where  j    is a stochastic variable. The number of inventions from a project increases with j x , 
given the type of project specified by the combination of  j    and  j  . That is,  0 /    j j x z . 
If the firm level knowledge stock enhances the R&D productivity in terms of the number of 
inventions, the number of inventions from a project also increases with K. 
K x z j j    /
2 may be positive or negative, depending on whether the exhaustion is more 
important than the cumulative gain from technology development within a firm.   
  We denote the quality of invention i from the project j in terms of its expected 
economic value by  j i q ,   (Without loss of the generality, we assume that the inventions are 
ordered by the level of the quality). It is randomly given from the value distribution. The 
distribution of the quality of inventions will be generally be affected by the level of R&D effort 
j x  of a firm for the project. Higher R&D expenditure would increase the value of the most 
valuable patents further, while it would also increase the supply of low quality inventions due 
to the exhaustion of valuable inventions, so that the mean quality may increase or decrease 
(Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) presents a model assuming the constancy of the mean quality). 
) , , , ; ( , , j i t j j j j i K x g q            (3) 
where  j i,    is a stochastic variable.   
We assume that a firm can capture  ) (A m  of  j i q ,  for its profit where  A  represents 
the size or scope of complementary assets the firm possess.  ) (A m   increases with A. The firm 
patents such invention only if it is not less than the cost of patenting (g per invention).   




a firm with larger complementary assets seeks for a patent even for a low quality invention and 
the total number of patents it obtains from a project also increases. 
) , , , , ; ( j j j j j A K x n n               ( 5 ) ,  
where  j    is a stochastic variable and we have 
0 /    A n j .                  ( 6 )   
If we denote the threshold quality satisfying condition (4) as an equality by  ) ( , A q j thre , 
       0 / ) ( ,    A A q j thre                  ( 7 )       
Since we have more inventions for a larger inventive effort, we have 
0 /    j j x n                     ( 8 )       
  A firm chooses R&D effort  j x  so as to maximize the following expected profit 
from the project: 
     g n K x c q A m g A K x j j i n i j j j j ) , ( ) ( ) , , , , ; ( , ~ 1       (9) 
We take into account that the cost of R&D effort for a project depends on the firm scale (K), 
since a large firm may have elastic supply of inventors and a pool of inventors with diverse 
specializations. The marginal cost of R&D effort rises as R&D effort increases 
0 /    j x c and
 
0 /
2 2    j x c                              
 
(10).  
We also assume that the marginal revenue declines with the R&D effort.     
    0 / } ) ( { , ~ 1 j j i n i x q A m
j
  




j j i n i x q A m
j     ( 1 1 )      
The optimal choice of R&D effort by is given by   
    ) ; , , , (
* g A K h x j j j                                  ( 1 2 )  




effort.   
0 ) , , , , ; (
*  g A K x j j j                                    ( 1 3 ) .  
From assumptions (10) and (11), we have 
0 /
*    A x j  
This induced expansion of the R&D effort will increase the quality of infra-marginal 
patented inventions and also the supply of the patented inventions with the threshold quality. 
However, controlling for this, the increase of the size of complementary assets (A) reduces the 
quality of a randomly selected patented invention, since it increases the chance that a lower 
quality invention is patented due to a lower threshold.                         
 
2.2  Main  hypotheses  
Based on the above framework, we can state the following six hypotheses on the source of the 
scale economies of a large firm in R&D. 
  
Hypothesis 1 on complementary assets 
If a larger size of complementary assets of a firm enhances the expected appropriation, we 
would observe higher R&D productivity in terms of the number of patents for a project located 
in a firm with larger complementary assets. At the same time, we would observe a lower value 
of a patent randomly selected from such a project.   
 
Hypothesis 2 on internal knowledge inflow   
If internal knowledge inflow is an important source of scale economies, an inventor in a large 
firm recognizes higher importance in such knowledge inflows as the source of the conception 




number of patents for a project and/or in the value of a patent.   
 
Hypothesis 3 on external knowledge inflow   
If external knowledge inflow is an important source of scale economy, an inventor in a large 
firm recognize higher importance in such knowledge inflow as the source of the conception of 
the R&D project and such inflow is associated with higher R&D productivity in terms of the 
number of patents for a project and/or in the value of a patent.   
 
Hypothesis 4 on size of inventor team   
If the size of inventor team is an important source of scale economy, a large firm promotes the 
formation of a large inventor team and large size of inventor team enhances the R&D 
performance. 
 
3.  Data and descriptive statistics 
We use the novel dataset from the survey of Japanese inventors implemented by the 
RIETI (Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, See Nagaoka and Walsh (2009) for 
details of the survey design). The survey covers the patents by Japanese applicants who applied 
for Japanese patents with priority years between 1995 and 2001. A majority of survey 
questionnaires ( around 70%) were sent to the randomly selected triadic patents which were 
not only granted patents in the United States, and but also were applied for in Europe and 
Japan. They are of higher quality than the average. Oversampling high-quality patents helps us 
avoiding sending most questionnaires to those with relatively low quality patents. RIETI 
received 3,658 responses on triadic patents and 1,501 responses on non-triadic patents, the 
population of which were also randomly selected. We focus only on those patents applied by a 




characteristics of the R&D projects that yielded these patents as well as the patent and inventor 
information. We supplemented the dataset with the business information (e.g. sales size, R&D) 
of the applicant firms from the Basic Survey of Business Activities (BSBA) of the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) as well as the US patent information obtained from the 
NBER patent database. We cover the R&D projects of around 400 matched firms. 
  We would like to begin looking at the composition of projects by business objectives. 
We identify 4 business objectives. The survey asks “What is the objective of the R&D project 
that led to the development of this patent?” As shown in Figure 1, 50% of the projects (core 
business projects, hereafter) target the core business of the firm. 22% of the projects aim at 
creating new business line and 8% at enhancing the technology base of the firm or cultivating 
new seeds. Figure 2 shows the stage and scope of R&D projects. We identify 9 types of 
projects: 7 types of projects in R&D stage and 2 types of projects in non-R&D stage (technical 
service such as design and engineering or the other stage). Pure projects, covering only one of 
basic, applied or development stage, account for roughly 75% of the projects. Pure 
development project is the most common and accounts for a half of the projects. 19 % of the 
all projects involve basic research (8% of them are pure basic research projects and 11 % are 
the projects covering basic research and the other stage). 6% of the projects are integrated: 
covering all three stages from basic research to development. The projects from non-R&D 
stage account for 10% of the projects in each business objective. Technical service is as 
frequent as basic research.   
(Figure 1, 2) 
    Figure 3 show how frequently the various knowledge sources are recognized as very 
important for suggesting the R&D project which yielded the focal invention. It identifies the 
most important 9 sources: patent literature, vertical source (the max of the score of the 




scientific literature, competitors, fairs or exhibitions, technical conferences and workshops, 
research organization (the max of the score of the importance of a university and that of a 
public laboratory) and standards documents. According to Figure 3, patent literature and 
vertical source are recognized to be very important for more than 20% of the projects. 
Scientific literature and internal source follow (they are very important for more than 15% of 
the projects). The fact that internal knowledge source is very important most frequently does 
not imply that the invention which depends most on it has a high value. We will see later from 
our econometric investigation that the project for which internal knowledge source is very 
important does not have a good performance.         
(Figures 3) 
There are two major measures of inventive efforts: the number of inventors of the 
focal patent and the total man months spent by all researcher for the project (we have 8 ranks: 
1-3, 4-6,7-12,13-24,25-48,49-72,73-96, 97 or more). It is important to note that the number of 
inventors is one component of the total man months. As shown in Figure 4, two thirds of the 
projects involve 2 or more 2 inventors and around one fifth of the projects involve 4 or more 
inventors. As shown in Figure 5, one quarter of the projects involve only up to 3 man months, 
and another one quarter of the projects involve more than 25 man months. Thus, there exist 
large variations of man months spent for the project. 
(Figure 4,5) 
There are two performance measures of R&D activity we focus in this paper.  One 
is the number of patents generated from the R&D project (variable name size_pat). The survey 
asks “How many domestic patents do you expect your organization will be granted from the 
R&D project that led to the discovery of this patent?” The respondent chooses from 1 (one. 
only this patent), 2 (two to five), 3(six to ten), 4 (eleven to fifty), 5 (fifty one to one hundred), 6 




name valued2), which is the answer to the following question: “How would you rank the 
economic value of the surveyed patent among the technological accomplishments in the same 
technological area during the same period in Japan?” Again, it is a multiple-choice question 
with the choices: 1 (Unknown: treated as missing in valued2), 2 (below 50 percentile), 3 
(above 50
th percentile), 4 (top 25
th percentile), 5 (top 10
th percentile). Note that it is a relative 
performance measure. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the distributions of these two performance 
measures. According to Figure 6, 70% of the projects generate less than 5 domestic patents 
from the project, while 4 % of the projects produce more than 50 patents. According to Figure 
7, 9% of the sampled patents belong to top 10% rank.       
(Figure 6,7) 
 
4.  Empirical Models   
First, we estimate knowledge production function (Griliches (1984)), corresponding 
to equation (3) and (5) in section 2. Compared to the standard formulation, we specify the 
project characteristics in detail. We use the number of patents granted for the inventions from 
the project (size_pat) and the value of the sampled patent (valued2). The econometric model 
we use is the following form of the ordered logit model: 
jfi j ft jft dummies Z K y        ) (
*      ( 1 4 )  
where y
*
jft is the latent variable for the number of patents (size_pat) and for the inventor’s 
self-evaluated economic value of the focal patent (valued2) from project j in firm f in 
application year t,  Kft is the firm f’s characteristics in year t, and Zj is the project j’s 
characteristics (including the efforts or R&D input variables for the project). We present a 
result using the dummy for the internal use of a patent (use2) as a dependent variable replacing 
the above subjective value in Appendix Table 2 for two reasons. A specification based on the 




whether the focal patent is internally used either for the product of a firm or for its production 
process could be more objectively decided. The dummies include the application year 
dummies (1995-2002), and 38 technology class dummies as controls.  i j,   is the error term. 
We take into account the potential correlation of the error terms across the projects of a firm by 
clustering.  
Since effort variables ( a part of Zj ), especially man months, are likely to be 
endogenous to missing variables such as firm or project specific market or technological 
opportunity, the coefficients of these variables would likely to be upward biased and the 
contribution of the other variables on productivity would be underestimated. In order to assess 
the importance of such bias, we also estimate a “reduced model”, which excludes input or 
effort variables from project j’s characteristics variables.   
  Second, we estimate the equations giving the knowledge inflow and the firm’s choice 
of the inventive efforts, which corresponds to equations (1) and (12) in section 2. In order to 
evaluate the direct and indirect effects of firm characteristics, we do not include the knowledge 
flow variables for equation (12) by using equation (1). The basic structure of the equation for 
estimation is the same as equation (14), except for that project j’s characteristics do not include 
the information inflow from knowledge sources nor inventive efforts. The dependent variables 
are the importance of knowledge inflows to the conception of the research project for 5 sources 
(cncpt_own for internal knowledge, cncpt_sci  for scientific literature, cncpt_pat for patent 
literature, cncpt_v for vertical partner (suppliers or users) and cncpt_res for research base such 
as a university), the number of inventors (lninventors) and the total man months for research 
both in the natural logarithm (lnmonth2). The importance of knowledge inflows are measured 
by Likert scale (0 for “non-use”, 5 for “very important”). We also introduce the indicator for a 
PhD of the inventor as a control over human capital input. Since there is a possibility that the 




the team of inventors search for useful idea before actually initiating the research project), we 
also estimate the equation with additional controls over the size of the number of inventors of 
the focal patent and the education level of the inventor, which is provided in the appendix 
Table 3. 
The independent variables for project characteristics include business objectives 
(core business (base), non-core business, unclassified existing business, new business, 
enhancing technology base, and others), research stage (basic research, applied research(base), 
or development), and type of research project (new product, new process(base), improvement 
of product, or improvement of process). Knowledge source variables are also used as 
independent variables for some specifications. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. 
(Table 1) 
As for firm characteristics, variable lnsales indicates the logarithmic sales of the 
applicant firm, the variable rds indicates the R&D intensity of the firm (R&D/sales). We have 
chosen the R&D intensity of the firm instead of more symmetric logarithm form ( ln1rds=ln 
(R&D+1)/Sales)
4, due to the former better explanatory power of the value of the patent. But 
the main results are not dependent on this choice (see Appendix Table 1, in particular Model 2). 
We also use the US patent stocks of each firm in each technology class relevant to the focal 
patent (ln1uspat=ln(1+us patent stocks for each sector)), which is constructed from the NBER 
patent database, using the perpetual inventory method with depreciation rate of 15%. Since 
only a half of the Japanese patent applications are examined while the Japanese firms have to 
pay additional fees and cost of translations for filing US patent applications so that these are 
screened, the US patents by the Japanese firm are more likely to be good indicators of 
knowledge production of the Japanese firms. The coefficient of lnsales measures the effect of 
firm size, including that of complementary assets, not captured by the patent stock variable. 
                                                  





The size of sales reflects both the physical complementary assets such as production as well as 
non-physical complementary assets such as the strength of brand names of the firm
5. The R&D 
intensity at the firm level measures the R&D capability of a firm as well as potential spillover 
from concurrent R&D within the firm. If there is a strong economy of scale or scope at firm 
level in R&D, firm size measure as well as R&D intensity would have a positive effect on 
R&D productivity at project level.   
Technology class dummies and application years (adjusted for priority years) of the 
patents control for the variations of technological or demand opportunities across sectors and 
over time. We also use the calendar time between the initiation of research and the application 
of the focal patent (res_app) and the triadic patent dummy as additional controls. It is more 
likely that the invention process will produce more inventions if more calendar time is 
consumed between the initial of the project to the application of the focal patent even for given 
number of man months and that of inventors. We expect that the sub sample of triadic patents 
have higher means than those of non-triadic patents in R&D performance measures. 
 
5.  Estimation results 
5.1 Findings from knowledge production function 
Table 2_A shows the results for R&D productivity with the number of patents 
(size_pat) as a dependent variable
6. Model 1 and 2 provides gross outputs without controlling 
knowledge inflow and effort variables, while Model 3 provides outputs with controlling 
knowledge inflow variables, and Model 4 provides outputs with further controls over inventive 
efforts. Model 1 does not have the patent stock variable and covers non-listed firms too so that 
it cover 3,400 projects from more than 700 firms, while Model 2 has the patent stock variable 
                                                  
5  The size of (tangible) assets is found to be less significant than the size of sales. 
6  In order to examine whether focusing on relatively more valuable patents would make any 
difference in the results, we also did the estimation restricting our sample to triadic patents in 




and covers only listed firms (2,700 projects from 440 firms). Overall the coefficients of the 
common variables of these two Models are similar. In addition, the coefficients of Model 3 and 
Model 4 are also very similar, implying that the endogeneity of inventive efforts does not 
significantly affect the coefficients of the rest of the variables, including firm characteristics.   
We will begin with briefly discussing the results of the estimations for objectives and 
stages of the research project. A project targeting new business generates most patents from a 
project. According to the estimates, it amounts to around 20% more. We will later see that the 
value of a patent from such project tends to be low (see Table 2_B). The combination of these 
two evidences seems to indicate the importance of patenting in new business, for which 
patenting plays a relatively important role for appropriation. Compared to pure applied 
research, the integrated project generates significantly more patents (40% more), even 
controlling for the research input such as man hours and the number of inventors. A similar 
pattern can be observed for that combining applied research and development. On the other 
hand, pure development project produces the least number of patents. The improvement 
projects (especially for process improvement) generate significantly smaller number of patents, 
although such difference declines once we control for inventive inputs.     
(Table 2_A) 
  The significance of knowledge inflow to getting an idea for a research project varies 
significantly across sources, according to Model 3 and 4. Patent literature for the conception of 
inventions is significant for the number of patents from a project. Use of scientific literature 
has a significantly positive effect on the number of patents only if we do not control for 
inventive efforts. The use of the knowledge from university and a research laboratory has a 
highly significant effect on the number of patents (at 1% statistical significance). While neither 
internal source nor vertical knowledge source is significant, it does not mean that they are not 




knowledge sources more significantly does not produce more patents, even though they still 
provide opportunities for inventions.   
    According to Model 4, the (total) man-month of researchers is positively and highly 
significantly associated with the number of patents generated from the project. The implied 
elasticity is 0.2, which is very similar to the level found by Henderson and Cockburn (1996) 
for the number of patents from drug discovery, suggesting a significant decreasing return to the 
project level R&D effort. In contrast, the number of inventors variable is not significant, 
implying that there is no additional effect of the team size (note that team size is a part of total 
man months). A PhD is also significant for the number of patents (the effect amount to around 
15%). We have to bear in mind that these inventive efforts variables are likely to be 
overestimated, due to project-level missing variables such as those on technological or market 
opportunities, although we extensively control for the project characteristics and technology 
sectors. 
There are three firm level variables: sales, R&D intensity and patent stock. Firm scale 
matters since the sum of the coefficients of lnsales and ln1uspat is highly significant. As 
shown in the last line of Table 2_A, it is positive and highly significant. The implied elasticity 
is around 0.06, which is significantly lower than those (around 0.25) estimated by Henderson 
and Cockburn (1996) for the effect of firm level R&D on the number of drug discovery patents 
(triadic patents). Very importantly, among three firm level variables (sales, R&D and patent 
stock), only sales variable is highly significant. If we replace the sales variable by the R&D 
variable and drops the R&D intensity, the R&D variable becomes significant, as shown in 
Appendix Table 1 (see Model 1). Once we have sales variable, a firm level R&D or patent 
stock is not significant (see Model 2 and 3 in Table 2_A and Model 2 in Appendix Table 1), 
while a project level R&D effort is highly significant. This strongly suggests that the source of 




appropriation advantage due to complementary assets or the firm level capability to absorb 
external knowledge. Appendix Table 1 also shows that the main results are not dependent on 
the choice of the R&D intensity.   
We then turn to the value of the focal patent as the output measure of R&D. 
According to Table 2_B, a project for non-core business produces a significantly less valuable 
patent
7. Among stages of research, the integrated project tends to generate a most valuable 
patent, even controlling for the research input such as man hours and the number of inventors 
(40% more). We observe a similar result for the number of patents (see Table 2_A). These 
results may reflect a selection (integration is chosen to gain a speed in implementing a project 
with a high expected return) or an efficient transfer of knowledge across stages of research in 
an integrated project. An improvement projects generate significantly less valuable patents, 
although such difference declines once we control for inventive inputs.     
(Table 2_B) 
  According to Model 7 and 8, the significance of knowledge inflow to getting an idea 
for an invention varies significantly across sources. Similar to the effect on the number of 
patents, the use of the knowledge from university and a research laboratory has a significant 
and positive effect on the value of a patent. This may indicate higher private value of 
pre-publication research outcomes at university and the other public research organization. 
Vertical knowledge source is also significant and positive, indicating the importance of 
combining knowledge such as those of technology and market across organizational 
boundaries (note that we did not observe no negative return on the number of patents). Very 
interestingly, internal knowledge source has a significantly negative coefficient
8. Later we 
show that the main source of internal knowledge is closely related with the firm’s patent stock 
                                                  
7  Assuming log normal distribution of the value of the patent, the implied effect is around 20% 
less. 
8  Assuming log normal distribution of the value of the patent, the implied effect (the patent from a 




(See Table 3). Own patented technologies may not provide (privately) valuable knowledge for 
a research project, because they are publicly known. Patent literature and scientific literature 
are not significant, perhaps again due to their public nature.   
 Both the (total) man-months of researchers and the inventor team size are positive 
and highly significant. The increase of man month per an inventor, not accompanied with the 
increase of inventor, has the effect amounting to less than one half of the effect of the increase 
of inventor team size (the coefficient size is 0.14 vs. 0.34)
9. This implies that inventor team 
size has a significant additional effect on the value of a patent, controlling for the total man 
months, while it is not for the number of patents. A PhD is significant only at 10 % level of 
statistical significance. Appendix Table 1 provides results consistent with the above finding. 
Inventor team size has a significant additional effect on the value of a patent, controlling for 
the total man months.   
Firm scale does not matter for the value of the focal patent since the sum of the 
coefficients of lnsales and ln1uspat is insignificant (both are insignificant), as shown in the last 
line of the Table 2_B. There is no significantly negative effect of the sales size on the value of 
the focal patent, as would be implied by Hypothesis 1 on complementary assets. There are two 
explanations for accounting for this gap. First, our specification may not fully control the 
endogenous increase of inventive efforts in response to the increase of complementary assets. 
As discussed in section 2, such increase would enhance the qualities of infra-marginal 
high-quality inventions. The probability of the use of the inventions is less subject to such 
effect, since most of these high quality inventions are already used and most of low quality 
inventions will remain unused even if there is a marginal increase of inventive efforts. In fact, 
as shown in Appendix Table 2, the sales size has a significantly negative effect on the use of 
the focal invention. Second, there may be firm scale advantage due to more inflow from 
                                                  
9  Assuming log normal distribution of the value of the patent, the implied elasticity for the increase 




external knowledge sources. We will see in next section that an inventor in a large firm 
recognized high importance on knowledge inflow from scientific literature.   
On the other hand, R&D intensity of a firm has a positive and significant coefficient. 
One potential interpretation of such effect might be spillover from concurrent R&D. However, 
if it is important, it should also matter for the number of patents, but it is not (see Table 2_A). 
In addition, R&D intensity is not positively correlated with the level of the importance of 
internal knowledge inflow, once we control for the patent stock (See Table 3). A more natural 
interpretation is the capability of a firm to systematically produce high value patents, including 
the cases where a firm “owns” a number of very productive R&D opportunities. In such case, a 
firm not only generates valuable patents (a patent which yields large cost reduction or large 
increase of the willingness to pay) but also spends a high level of R&D so that its R&D 
intensity becomes high (Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980)).   
 
5.2 Findings from knowledge inflow 
Table 3 shows how the knowledge inflows from five major sources are affected by 
project and firm characteristics. As shown in the last line of Table 3, firm level scale economy 
exists for internal knowledge source and for scientific literature. Thus, a project in a lager firm 
has more internal knowledge inflow and that from scientific literature, showing the existence 
of scale economy. Such enhanced inflows would result in more number of research projects 
initiated from a firm. Scale effect does not exist for patent literature and for university and 
research institutes.   
(Table 3) 
  Table 3 also provides information on for which type of a project each knowledge 
inflow is important and on the sources of the scale effects. Internal knowledge source is less 




involving applied and development. As for the effects of firm characteristics, internal 
knowledge inflow is significantly and positively affected by the patent stock of the firm in the 
technology sector of the focal patent. That is, internal knowledge inflow is significantly 
affected by the past inventive activities of the firm. Neither the current R&D nor the sales level 
of a firm is significant. As for scientific literature, it is important when the project covers basic 
research. It is not affected by the patent stock (it actually has a negative coefficient), nor by the 
level of R&D of the firm but by the sales size of a firm. This seems to indicate that a large firm 
is more likely to engage in basic research due to its appropriation advantage.       
  Knowledge inflow from patent literature is not strongly dependent on the project 
characteristics. It is also independent of firm size. This may not be surprising, since such 
literature is publicly disclosed and inventors in both large and small firms regularly review 
such literature to evaluate their research project and the patentability of its output. Knowledge 
inflow from vertical partners (suppliers and user) is particularly important for a research at the 
stage of technical service (post R&D stage). Its importance declines significantly with firm 
size (declines both with sales and with patent stock). It also declines with the level of R&D. 
These results seem to suggest that the division of inventive tasks is differently organized for a 
large firm and for a small firm. A small firm outsources the seeds of the inventions to users and 
suppliers, while a large firm develops them based on its own effort. Finally, knowledge inflow 
from a university and a research institution is important for a project involving basic research 
and for a project targeted at new business. While it is not size dependent, it is significantly less 
important in the technology area where the firm has a large patent stock. This indicates that a 
firm looks for collaboration with a university in those sectors where it has a weak technology 
position (note that we control for technology class).   
  Table 2 in the appendix shows the estimation results with additional controls of the 




One important additional result is that the size of inventor team is significantly positive for all 
sources of knowledge. This seems to indicate that a larger team enables a team to collect 
information more intensively from diversified sources. In addition, a PhD inventor facilitates 
the use of information from scientific and patent literature as well as from the research base.   
 
5.3 Inventor team size and man months   
Table 4 shows how the size of inventor team and the size of man months are related to the 
project and firm characteristics. The team size is small when the project focuses on the 
development stage. The size of man months is small when the project is improvement and the 
length of the research duration up to the patent application is short. The projects for 
strengthening technology base tend to require significantly less of the two. Both are positively 
dependent on firm size. In particular, the number of inventors increases significantly with sales 
size while it decline with the size of patent stock. The elasticity is 0.04 and 0.03, which implies 
that a number of inventors expand much more rapidly than the man months per inventor, as 
firm size increases. Furthermore, we have found earlier that the size of inventor team matters 
for the value of an invention, even if we control for total man months. Thus, inventor team size 
is also an important source of scale economy of a large firm.   
(Table 4) 
In order to probe the sources of scale effect on inventor team, Model 3 and model 6 
in Table 4 introduce the Herfindahl index based on the sector shares of the US patents of each 
firm and its debt asset ratio. The Herfindahl index measures (negatively) the diversity of the 
technological skills of the inventors of a firm. Debt asset ratio measures the financial constraint 
of a firm.    The coefficients for Model 3 show that the technological diversity of a firm helps a 
firm to expand the size of the inventor team, while debt asset ratio does not. In addition, 




man months. According to Model 6, these results suggest one source of the scale economy of a 
firm is the technological diversity of a large firm.   
 
6.  Conclusions and discussions 
This paper has explored the sources of firm level scale economies in R&D, based on 
the unique project level data from a new large-scale survey of Japanese inventors, matched 
with firm level data. Our data covers more than 400 firms and around 2500 patents and 
incorporates very detailed project level information. We have focused on four potential 
sources: complementary assets, internal and external knowledge inflows and inventor team 
size. Major findings are the following. A larger firm tends to generate more patents from a 
research project but no more valuable patent, controlling for the objectives and the inventive 
efforts for the project, showing the existence of firm scale economy. The sales size of a firm 
rather than its R&D (or patent stocks) significantly affects the number of patents from the 
project. While the firm level R&D significantly explains the number of patents from the 
project, controlling for project level R&D (inventor man months), it becomes insignificant 
once we have sales variable. Moreover, the focal patent becomes less used as firm size 
increases. These results strongly suggest that the main source of such scale economy is not 
internal knowledge inflow within a firm but its appropriation advantage. This finding is further 
reinforced by our finding that internal knowledge inflow to the conception of the project does 
not contribute to high R&D performance. 
  An inventor in a large firm often gets important information from internal knowledge 
inflow as well as from scientific literature. Internal knowledge inflow is significantly and 
positively affected by the patent stock of the firm in the technology sector of the focal patent, 
while scientific literature is significantly and positively associated with the sales size of a firm. 





The size of an inventor team increases with the firm size and its technological 
diversity. On the other hand its debt asset ratio does not constrain the team size. A larger team 
size is significantly associated with higher patent value, while it has no effect on the number of 
patents, controlling for total man months. Thus, inventor team size is an important source for 
firm level scale advantage.   
  Some notable the other findings are the following.   
(1)A project targeting new business generates most patents among those for core-business, 
non-core business, new business and technology base (or seeds). However, the value of a 
patent from such project tends to be low. This seems to indicate the importance of patenting in 
new business, for which patenting plays a relatively important role for appropriation. 
(2)Integrated project covering all three stages of research and development shows a good 
performance in both the number of patent and the value of the focal patent. This may reflect a 
selection (integration is chosen to gain a speed in implementing a project with a high expected 
return) or an efficient transfer of knowledge across stages of research in an integrated project.   
(3) The research project driven by university and the other public research in its conception 
performs better than the research driven by scientific and technical literature. This may 
indicate higher private value of pre-publication research outcomes at university and the other 
public research organization.   
(4) The knowledge inflow from users or suppliers helps a firm to generate a high value patent, 
indicating the importance of combining knowledge (such as those of technology and market) 
across organizational boundaries. However, they are important at development stage, so that 
they do not substitute for scientific discoveries and knowledge. 
(5)R&D intensity of a firm (rather than the scale of R&D) significantly accounts for the value 




patent stocks). The capability to identify high return R&D projects seems to be more important 
than the scale of R&D. 
One source of a potential bias of our study is our patent based selection of the 
projects for our survey. In particular, a small firm may selectively patent its inventions than a 
large firm so that our survey might have picked relatively high performance R&D projects for 
a small firm. This sample selection, however, works against us finding the scale economy of a 
firm in knowledge production function. Thus, our conclusions are robust to this potential bias.   
Similarly, although we cannot control the endogeneity of project-level inventive efforts such as 
man-months, it tends to work against finding the significance of firm level scale advantage.   
One caveat we would like to make is that there can be significant differences across 
technology sectors in the importance and the sources of scale economies at firm level. Our 
preliminary investigations suggest that scale economy is more important in chemical and 
computer technologies, but it is less so in mechanical technology. In computer technology, the 
size of firm sales is much more important than its patent stock as a source of scale economy 
while they are similarly important in chemical technology. We intend to conduct more detailed 
analysis of the variations and its causes across sector differences. For an example, internal 
knowledge flow may be more important in the sectors where knowhow is important and 
technology development is cumulative. Our results in this paper provide an “average” picture, 
which depends on the sectoral composition of the Japanese industry.   
We can draw the following implications. First, internal knowledge stock often does 
not confer strong source of competitive advantage. The performance of an R&D for which 
internal knowledge is important tends to be low, although such knowledge is still useful for 
generating R&D projects. One reason would be that much of such knowledge is often   publicly 
known (certainly so for patented technologies). Another reason might be a diminishing return 




combination” for invention seems to be important. 
Second, it would be important to have a team of inventors with efficient scale and 
diversity, taking advantage of the internal inventor resources of a firm. Our research suggests 
the possibility that one important source of scale economy is the capability of a large firm to 
form a large scale team, which can combine different technical expertise. Internal knowledge 
inflow may not automatically occur, even if there is a good reservoir of knowledge inside a 
firm. Such knowledge could be activated only if the inventor embodying such knowledge joins 
in the team and works together. 
Third, while our research suggests that the research project driven by university and 
the other public research in its conception performs better than the research driven by scientific 
and technical literature. This result does not indicate low social value of the scientific 
publication, since its social value is significantly not reflected in private value, due to research 
competition and spillover. It is important to note that scientific publication is more often used 
as a source of inventions than the direct contacts with university and the other public research 
organizations (see Figure 3). 
While an integrated project covering all three stages of research and development 
shows a good performance in both the number of patent and the value of the focal patent, there 
is some evidence that a large firm is less likely to engage in such project. One possibility 
causing such correlation is more specializations of a large firm between research and 
development and the existence of organizational barriers for an integrated project in such firm. 
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Note.    Around 3,100 triadic patents and 1,300 non-triadic patents 
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Figure 7.      Distribution of the value of a patent from the project   




















 Table  1.   Descriptive  statistics 
Variable Explanation Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
size_pat the number of patents fom the patent 3,460 2.324 1.086 1 6
valued2 economic value of the focal patent  2,491 3.081 0.921 2 5
use2 use of the focal patent by the applicant 3,452 0.515 0.500 0 1
cncpt_sci scientific and technical literature 3,432 2.961 1.744 0 5
cncpt_pat patent literature 3,441 3.314 1.636 0 5
cncpt_own internal knowledge 3,412 3.334 1.483 0 5
cncpt_v vertical partner  3,431 3.043 1.816 0 5
cncpt_res research base such as a university 3,409 1.509 1.595 0 5
objective3 Business objective of research
2 non-core business 3,504 0.152 0.359 0 1
3 unclassified existing business 3,504 0.045 0.207 0 1
4 new business 3,504 0.224 0.417 0 1
5 enhancing technology base 3,504 0.079 0.270 0 1
6 other 3,504 0.007 0.086 0 1
basic_pure pure basic 3,504 0.071 0.257 0 1
dev_pure pure development 3,504 0.504 0.500 0 1
b_a basic&applied 3,504 0.036 0.186 0 1
a_d applied&dev 3,504 0.111 0.314 0 1
b_d basic&applied 3,504 0.015 0.123 0 1
integrated integrated 3,504 0.063 0.243 0 1
service technical service 3,504 0.086 0.281 0 1
oth_stage oth_stage 3,504 0.014 0.116 0 1
prodproc type of research project
2 improvement of process 3,504 0.086 0.280 0 1
3 new product 3,504 0.601 0.490 0 1
4 improvement of process 3,504 0.218 0.413 0 1
5 other 3,504 0.011 0.105 0 1
lnsales logarithm of sales of a firm 3,504 12.710 1.788 6.757 16.024
rds R&D intensity (R&D/sales) 3,504 0.053 0.038 0.0 0.629
uspatent_stock stock of us patents in the technology sector 2,832 137 248 0.0 2018
ln1uspat logarithm (1+uspatent_stock) 2,832 3.516 1.888 0.0 7.611
hhi_pat Herfindahl index of the patents granted 2,832 0.202 0.144 0.11
debtasset debt asset ratio 3,504 0.450 0.280 0.000 2.492
res_app
time between initiation of the project to the
application of the focal patent 3,408 1.702 1.503 0.080 15
triadic dummy for a triadic patent 3,504 0.704 0.457 0 1
applyear application year 3,504 1,997.953 1.848 1,995 2,002
inventors the number of inventors 3,504 2.489 1.631 1 21
month2 the total man months for research 3,457 23.184 33.747 1.5 143




Table 2_A    Determinants of R&D Performance at project level (the number of patents granted) (Clustering on applicant, single applicant only) 
  
 Number of obs   =   2730  Number of obs   =2649  Number of obs   = 2629
 Robust  Robust  Robust  Robust
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Non-core _Iobjectiv~2 -0.136 0.093 -0.158 0.107 -0.103 0.108 -0.138 0.112
Unknown _Iobjectiv~3 -0.289 0.162 * -0.106 0.189 -0.036 0.182 -0.008 0.174
New business _Iobjectiv~4 0.314 0.098 *** 0.350 0.117 *** 0.320 0.128 ** 0.327 0.128 **
Technology base _Iobjectiv~5 0.002 0.171 -0.001 0.207 0.022 0.200 0.085 0.204
Other _Iobjectiv~6 1.038 0.699 0.621 0.677 0.796 0.600 0.587 0.604
basic basic_pure 0.076 0.147 0.057 0.157 -0.060 0.160 -0.061 0.161
dev dev_pure -0.149 0.124 -0.266 0.128 ** -0.295 0.125 ** -0.248 0.121 **
basic&applied b_a 0.169 0.170 0.134 0.181 -0.002 0.189 -0.015 0.188
applied&dev a_d 0.343 0.131 *** 0.294 0.147 ** 0.236 0.148 0.176 0.148
basic&applied b_d 0.339 0.239 0.305 0.279 0.331 0.281 0.400 0.291
integrated integrated 0.689 0.176 *** 0.614 0.205 *** 0.487 0.211 ** 0.504 0.203 **
service service -0.186 0.121 -0.244 0.148 * -0.182 0.153 -0.103 0.147
oth_stage oth_stage 0.147 0.291 0.318 0.349 0.383 0.363 0.378 0.347
Process improvement _Iprodproc_2 -0.670 0.182 *** -0.599 0.199 *** -0.612 0.203 *** -0.450 0.210 **
New product _Iprodproc_3 -0.031 0.140 0.093 0.152 0.103 0.159 0.083 0.171
Product improvement _Iprodproc_4 -0.430 0.144 *** -0.355 0.155 ** -0.329 0.158 ** -0.228 0.163
Other _Iprodproc_5 -0.607 0.366 * -0.545 0.438 -0.365 0.441 -0.255 0.477
patent literature cncpt_pat 0.072 0.033 ** 0.052 0.031 *
scientific literature cncpt_sci 0.063 0.033 * 0.038 0.031
internal cncpt_own 0.026 0.028 0.010 0.029
vertical cncpt_v 0.014 0.024 0.015 0.024
research base cncpt_res 0.070 0.027 ** 0.081 0.028 ***
number of inventors lninventors -0.039 0.074
man month lnmonth2 0.417 0.041 ***
PhD PhD 0.321 0.117 ***
Sales lnsales 0.177 0.027 *** 0.144 0.043 *** 0.107 0.048 ** 0.103 0.053 *
RD/sales rdsales -0.248 0.839 -0.057 0.912 0.201 0.926 0.680 0.991
Patent stock ln1uspat 0.017 0.026 0.044 0.028 0.041 0.028
research length lnres_app 0.427 0.045 *** 0.446 0.052 *** 0.401 0.052 *** 0.145 0.052 ***
triadic patent triadic 0.264 0.076 *** 0.195 0.085 ** 0.207 0.086 ** 0.118 0.090
Firm scale effect Firm size  lnsales+ln1usp 0.177 0.027 *** 0.161 0.037 *** 0.152 0.039 *** 0.144 0.043 ***
Note. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.    Cutoff points, dummies for application years and for US technology classes are not reported. 
Model 1
711 Clusters
Log pseudolikelihood = -
4345.9807     Pseudo R2       =
 Number of obs   =  3380
R&D Productivity (1): the number of patents from the project (size_pat)







Knowledge source  for
conception




Log pseudolikelihood = -
3570.9909                 Pseudo
Log pseudolikelihood = -
3426.9093                 Pseudo
Log pseudolikelihood = -
3313.6094                 Pseudo





Table 2_B    Determinants of R&D Performance at project level (the economic value of the patent)    (Clustering on applicant, single applicant only) 
R&D Productivity (2): the value of a patent from the project (valued2)
 Number of obs   =  1933
 Robust  Robust  Robust  Robust
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Non-core -0.503 0.121 *** -0.501 0.132 *** -0.541 0.137 *** -0.523 0.137 ***
Unknown 0.000 0.213 0.129 0.229 0.146 0.228 0.175 0.230
New business -0.165 0.095 * -0.140 0.107 -0.149 0.112 -0.183 0.109 *
Technology base -0.203 0.168 -0.320 0.177 * -0.325 0.178 * -0.295 0.187
Other 0.083 0.344 -0.111 0.542 -0.148 0.553 -0.207 0.551
basic -0.110 0.154 -0.162 0.173 -0.115 0.180 -0.120 0.180
dev -0.035 0.115 -0.107 0.130 -0.067 0.132 -0.002 0.135
basic&applied 0.442 0.211 ** 0.372 0.228 0.392 0.237 * 0.395 0.237 *
applied&dev 0.264 0.136 * 0.206 0.146 0.238 0.147 0.268 0.147 *
basic&applied 0.188 0.284 0.146 0.319 0.230 0.329 0.263 0.336
integrated 0.531 0.188 *** 0.405 0.221 * 0.403 0.223 * 0.445 0.218 **
service 0.027 0.146 0.011 0.168 -0.014 0.185 -0.003 0.188
oth_stage 0.185 0.426 0.093 0.468 0.057 0.517 0.018 0.536
Process improvement -0.568 0.160 *** -0.572 0.179 *** -0.537 0.198 *** -0.502 0.200 **
New product -0.103 0.138 -0.084 0.145 -0.073 0.156 -0.078 0.157
Product improvement -0.592 0.154 *** -0.546 0.167 *** -0.506 0.175 *** -0.482 0.179 ***
Other 0.472 0.401 0.491 0.445 0.510 0.477 0.545 0.483
patent literature 0.019 0.041 0.012 0.041
scientific literature -0.004 0.039 -0.019 0.040
internal -0.117 0.035 *** -0.125 0.036 ***
vertical 0.059 0.029 ** 0.062 0.029 **
research base 0.078 0.032 ** 0.082 0.032 **
number of inventors 0.205 0.066 ***
man month 0.137 0.035 ***
PhD 0.278 0.149 *
lnsales -0.009 0.028 0.001 0.038 0.004 0.039 -0.013 0.038
rdsales 2.412 1.089 ** 2.306 1.106 ** 2.211 1.112 ** 2.166 1.091 **
Patent stock 0.010 0.032 0.018 0.033 0.020 0.034
research length 0.264 0.059 *** 0.273 0.066 *** 0.243 0.067 *** 0.133 0.068*
triadic patent 0.572 0.093 *** 0.516 0.106 *** 0.492 0.106 *** 0.456 0.105 ***
Firm size  -0.009 0.028 0.012 0.034 0.022 0.035 0.008 0.032
Note. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.    Cutoff points, dummies for application years and for US technology classes are not report
Model 5
 Number of obs   = 2437
578 Clusters
Log pseudolikelihood = -
2964.1256                 Pseudo
380 Clusters
Log pseudolikelihood = -
2459.3033                 Pseudo
Log pseudolikelihood = -
2373.1149                 Pseudo
Log pseudolikelihood = -
2343.9992                 Pseudo
385 Clusters 382 Clusters
 Number of obs   = 2011  Number of obs   = 1946






Table 3       Knowledge inflow for initiation of the project (Clustering on applicant, single applicant only) 
 Number of obs   =    2758
436  clusters  436  clusters   435 clusters 436 clusters  435 clusters
 Robust  Robust  Robust  Robust  Robust
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.C o e f . S t d .   E r r .
Non-core _Iobjectiv~2 -0.152 0.106 -0.272 0.119 ** -0.207 0.114 * -0.165 0.115 -0.284 0.110 ***
Unknown _Iobjectiv~3 -0.174 0.174 -0.190 0.174 -0.477 0.155 *** -0.155 0.161 0.042 0.176
New business _Iobjectiv~4 -0.238 0.092 *** 0.152 0.098 0.045 0.089 -0.188 0.091 ** 0.234 0.107 **
Technology base _Iobjectiv~5 -0.316 0.166 * 0.059 0.179 -0.168 0.171 -0.464 0.167 *** 0.004 0.181
Other _Iobjectiv~6 -1.093 0.774 -0.845 0.527 -0.727 0.592 -0.581 0.427 -0.421 0.613
basic basic_pure -0.043 0.154 0.311 0.141 ** 0.234 0.147 -0.159 0.136 0.523 0.159 ***
dev dev_pure 0.156 0.106 -0.479 0.099 *** 0.000 0.103 0.333 0.115 *** -0.275 0.093 ***
basic&applied b_a 0.359 0.199 * 0.842 0.200 *** 0.397 0.227 * 0.004 0.170 0.522 0.213 **
applied&dev a_d 0.239 0.130 * -0.027 0.146 0.119 0.127 0.070 0.146 -0.126 0.140
basic&applied b_d -0.258 0.221 -0.360 0.312 -0.114 0.308 -0.186 0.277 -0.504 0.390
integrated integrated -0.058 0.186 0.397 0.157 ** 0.193 0.177 0.128 0.186 0.327 0.231
service service -0.073 0.156 -0.662 0.137 *** -0.319 0.134 ** 0.532 0.141 *** -0.273 0.149 *
oth_stage oth_stage -0.363 0.335 -0.809 0.390 ** -0.855 0.349 ** 1.065 0.447 ** -0.279 0.333
Process improvement _Iprodproc_2 0.092 0.144 -0.222 0.176 0.066 0.179 -0.195 0.176 0.021 0.186
New product _Iprodproc_3 0.056 0.132 0.091 0.131 0.149 0.128 0.248 0.138 * 0.131 0.142
Product improvement _Iprodproc_4 0.075 0.142 -0.253 0.160 0.164 0.146 0.032 0.143 -0.121 0.159
Other _Iprodproc_5 -0.428 0.465 0.427 0.379 -0.499 0.374 -0.744 0.361 ** 0.548 0.414
Sales lnsales 0.038 0.030 0.113 0.037 *** 0.040 0.038 -0.037 0.034 0.095 0.029 ***
RD/sales rdsales 0.262 0.949 0.513 0.933 -1.613 1.049 -4.859 1.218 *** 0.471 0.881
Patent stock ln1uspat 0.065 0.024 *** -0.040 0.033 -0.029 0.029 -0.052 0.031 * -0.090 0.027 ***
control triadic patent _Itriadic_1 0.130 0.073 * 0.159 0.076 ** -0.048 0.085 0.160 0.085 * 0.078 0.075
Firm scale effect Firm size  lnsales+ln1us
t
0.104 0.025 *** 0.073 0.031 ** 0.011 0.031   -0.088 0.034 *** 0.006 0.028
Note. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Cutoff points, dummies for application years and for US technology classes are not reported. 
Ordered logit for  cncpt_res
Firm characteristics









Log pseudolikelihood = -4041.8471
Pseudo R2       =     0.0133
Log pseudolikelihood = -
4080.7237                 Pseudo R2
Log pseudolikelihood = -4076.0566
Pseudo R2       =     0.0190
Log pseudolikelihood = -
4187.2743       Pseudo R2       =
Log pseudolikelihood = -3982.1417
Pseudo R2       =     0.0293





Table 4      Team size and man months of inventive labors (Clustering on applicant, single applicant only) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Number of obs =    3378  Number of obs   =  2731  Number of obs =    2731
 438 clusters  437 clusters 710 clusters  437 clusters             437 clusters            
 Robust  Robust  Robust  Robust  Robust  Robust
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Non-core _Iobjectiv~2 0.007 0.035 -0.017 0.037 -0.019 0.036 0.039 0.056 0.026 0.062 0.024 0.062
Unknown _Iobjectiv~3 -0.101 0.045 ** -0.130 0.053 ** -0.132 0.053 ** -0.234 0.100 ** -0.238 0.116 ** -0.239 0.116 **
New business _Iobjectiv~4 0.040 0.030 0.036 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.039 0.056 0.055 0.067 0.052 0.067
Technology base _Iobjectiv~5 -0.096 0.039 ** -0.098 0.050 * -0.098 0.051 * -0.140 0.082 * -0.164 0.090 * -0.162 0.090 *
Other _Iobjectiv~6 -0.071 0.116 -0.149 0.147 -0.148 0.148 -0.498 0.228 ** -0.392 0.288 -0.393 0.291
basic basic_pure 0.005 0.053 0.031 0.056 0.029 0.057 -0.020 0.107 -0.039 0.113 -0.042 0.113
dev dev_pure -0.138 0.031 *** -0.115 0.034 *** -0.119 0.034 *** -0.104 0.060 * -0.122 0.062 * -0.125 0.062 **
basic&applied b_a 0.010 0.065 0.043 0.071 0.037 0.071 -0.034 0.111 -0.009 0.120 -0.012 0.120
applied&dev a_d -0.135 0.037 *** -0.116 0.042 *** -0.123 0.042 *** 0.058 0.079 0.145 0.086 * 0.142 0.086
basic&applied b_d -0.092 0.079 -0.062 0.091 -0.069 0.091 -0.071 0.196 -0.046 0.233 -0.049 0.235
integrated integrated -0.107 0.049 ** -0.083 0.053 -0.088 0.053 * 0.064 0.106 0.003 0.120 0.002 0.120
service service -0.012 0.037 -0.029 0.044 -0.033 0.043 -0.207 0.076 *** -0.241 0.093 *** -0.242 0.093 ***
oth_stage oth_stage 0.070 0.101 0.119 0.105 0.114 0.105 -0.244 0.154 -0.185 0.192 -0.187 0.191
Process improvement _Iprodproc_2 -0.062 0.055 -0.016 0.067 -0.017 0.066 -0.467 0.099 *** -0.435 0.114 *** -0.436 0.114 ***
New product _Iprodproc_3 -0.036 0.040 -0.007 0.044 -0.006 0.044 0.031 0.074 0.032 0.081 0.030 0.080
Product improvement _Iprodproc_4 -0.071 0.045 -0.031 0.050 -0.033 0.051 -0.238 0.075 *** -0.257 0.082 *** -0.260 0.082 ***
Other _Iprodproc_5 -0.187 0.107 * -0.198 0.115 * -0.199 0.114 * -0.475 0.188 ** -0.447 0.234 * -0.449 0.234 *
Sales lnsales 0.043 0.015 *** 0.064 0.019 *** 0.049 0.021 ** 0.045 0.014 *** 0.021 0.021 0.011 0.024
RD/sales rdsales 0.049 0.476 0.387 0.506 0.412 0.544 -0.615 0.634 -0.566 0.733 -0.650 0.719
Patent stock ln1uspat -0.025 0.011 ** -0.026 0.011 ** 0.011 0.016 0.010 0.016
HHI of US patents hhi_pat -0.271 0.143 * 0.000 0.000
Debt asset debtasset 0.067 0.125 -0.098 0.122
research length lnres_app 0.644 0.026 *** 0.669 0.028 *** 0.670 0.028 ***
triadic patent triadic 0.172 0.022 *** 0.181 0.026 *** 0.182 0.026 *** 0.208 0.041 *** 0.183 0.046 *** 0.182 0.046 ***
Firm size  lnsales+ln1uspa 0.043 0.015 *** 0.039 0.022 * 0.023 0.024 0.045 0.014 *** 0.032 0.018 * 0.022 0.022
Note. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.    Cutoff points, dummies for application years and for US technology classes are not reported. 
  R-squared     =  0.2684


















Number of obs   =      2832 
  R-squared     =  0.1444
Root MSE      =  .57319
Number of obs   =      2832 
 R-squared     =  0.2684
Root MSE      =  1.1769
 R-squared     =  0.2648
Root MSE      =  1.1702
   R-squared     =  0.2689
Root MSE      =   1.177
R-squared     =  0.1347
Root MSE      =   .5677






Appendix  Table  1.   Estimations  based on R&D      (use of firm level R&D, ln1rd, as an independent variable) 
 Number of obs   = 2437
 Robust  Robust  Robust
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Non-core _Iobjectiv~2 -0.125 0.093 -0.135 0.093 -0.509 0.121 ***
Unknown _Iobjectiv~3 -0.278 0.165 * -0.290 0.162 * 0.005 0.214
New business _Iobjectiv~4 0.340 0.098 *** 0.312 0.098 *** -0.171 0.095 *
Technology base _Iobjectiv~5 0.021 0.173 0.001 0.170 -0.198 0.168
Other _Iobjectiv~6 1.057 0.695 1.035 0.702 0.073 0.334
basic basic_pure 0.085 0.149 0.083 0.147 -0.115 0.154
dev dev_pure -0.165 0.126 -0.145 0.124 -0.034 0.115
basic&applied b_a 0.200 0.173 0.174 0.169 0.425 0.211 **
applied&dev a_d 0.325 0.133 ** 0.346 0.131 *** 0.265 0.136 *
basic&applied b_d 0.333 0.242 0.329 0.239 0.182 0.289
integrated integrated 0.656 0.175 *** 0.696 0.176 *** 0.528 0.189 ***
service service -0.217 0.121 * -0.186 0.121 0.013 0.145
oth_stage oth_stage 0.102 0.281 0.155 0.291 0.186 0.427
Process improvement _Iprodproc_2 -0.650 0.182 *** -0.673 0.182 *** -0.578 0.159 ***
New product _Iprodproc_3 -0.040 0.142 -0.030 0.140 -0.101 0.138
Product improvement _Iprodproc_4 -0.443 0.147 *** -0.427 0.144 *** -0.590 0.154 ***
Other _Iprodproc_5 -0.601 0.374 -0.607 0.366 * 0.471 0.399
Sales lnsales 0.182 0.027 *** -0.004 0.028
RD/sales ln1rd 0.068 0.020 ***
RD ln1rds -0.026 0.020 0.036 0.025
research length lnres_app 0.427 0.045 *** 0.427 0.045 *** 0.266 0.059 ***
triadic patent triadic 0.259 0.077 *** 0.265 0.075 *** 0.574 0.093 ***
Note. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.    Cutoff points, dummies for application years and for US technology classes are not reported. 
control
 Number of obs   =  3381
Business Objective of
R&D  (Base:core)







Log pseudolikelihood = -
4368.8884     Pseudo R2  =
Log pseudolikelihood = -
4344.9469    Pseudo R2   =
Log pseudolikelihood = -
2965.1567      Pseudo R2   =
R&D Productivity (1): the number of patents from the project (size_pat)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
 Number of obs   =  3380






Appendix  Table  2.     Determinants of R&D Performance at project level (use of the focal patent, Clustering on applicant, single applicant only) 
R&D Productivity (3): Internal commercialization (use2)
 Number of obs   =    3370  Number of obs   =   2723  Number of obs   =   2619
 Robust  Robust  Robust  Robust
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Non-core -0.253 0.102 ** -0.331 0.121 *** -0.376 0.123 *** -0.374 0.128 ***
Unknown -0.051 0.183 0.023 0.217 -0.044 0.228 -0.053 0.219
New business -0.375 0.113 *** -0.325 0.127 ** -0.335 0.126 *** -0.353 0.127* * *
Technology base -1.542 0.169 *** -1.504 0.184 *** -1.509 0.185 *** -1.496 0.188 ***
Other -0.048 0.503 -0.259 0.548 -0.324 0.554 -0.339 0.583
basic -0.599 0.183 *** -0.535 0.200 *** -0.507 0.203 ** -0.515 0.204 **
dev 0.313 0.118 *** 0.407 0.122 *** 0.392 0.118 *** 0.423 0.121 ***
basic&applied -0.271 0.235 -0.269 0.247 -0.204 0.254 -0.199 0.260
applied&dev 0.166 0.128 0.276 0.143 * 0.294 0.139 ** 0.333 0.139 **
basic&applied -0.039 0.308 0.303 0.338 0.318 0.347 0.353 0.348
integrated 0.054 0.163 -0.016 0.195 0.056 0.202 0.080 0.200
service 0.719 0.149 *** 0.867 0.177 *** 0.759 0.180 *** 0.782 0.182 ***
oth_stage 0.824 0.313 *** 1.118 0.398 *** 0.875 0.405 ** 0.861 0.409 **
Process improvement 0.127 0.182 0.168 0.203 0.220 0.212 0.285 0.214
New product -0.057 0.151 -0.166 0.170 -0.131 0.180 -0.116 0.180
Product improvement -0.193 0.153 -0.269 0.175 -0.236 0.183 -0.214 0.185
Other -0.774 0.395 ** -0.366 0.457 -0.155 0.443 -0.079 0.445
patent literature -0.068 0.035 * -0.078 0.036 **
scientific literature -0.083 0.037 ** -0.090 0.037 **
internal 0.009 0.031 0.000 0.032
vertical 0.123 0.024 *** 0.120 0.024 ***
research base 0.024 0.031 0.029 0.030
number of inventors 0.172 0.069 **
man month 0.099 0.041 **
PhD 0.081 0.160
lnsales -0.125 0.024 *** -0.084 0.038 ** -0.060 0.039 -0.069 0.039 *
rdsales 0.044 1.025 -0.078 1.263 0.579 1.240 0.392 1.254
Patent stock -0.061 0.036 * -0.068 0.036 * -0.068 0.037 *
research length 0.115 0.051 ** 0.142 0.057 ** 0.150 0.061 ** 0.069 0.064
triadic patent 0.600 0.085 *** 0.609 0.093 *** 0.597 0.095 *** 0.575 0.096 ***
Firm scale effect -0.125 0.024 *** -0.145 0.031 *** -0.128 0.032 *** -0.137 0.032 ***
Note. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.    Cutoff points, dummies for application years and for US technology classes are not reported. 
Model 2
437 Clusters
Log pseudolikelihood = -1702.4083
Pseudo R2       =     0.0980
Model 1
712 Clusters
Log pseudolikelihood = -2115.1383      Pseudo
R2       =     0.0938
Log pseudolikelihood = -1627.2149
Pseudo R2       =     0.1104
Log pseudolikelihood = -1606.2739
Pseudo R2       =     0.1152
Model 3 Model 4
 Number of obs   =  2639






Appendix    Table 3.    Knowledge inflow for initiation of the project with inventor team size (Clustering on applicant, single applicant only) 
 Number of obs   =   2744
435  clusters   435  clusters   434 clusters 435 clusters  434 clusters
 Robust  Robust  Robust  Robust  Robust
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Non-core _Iobjectiv~2 -0.147 0.104 -0.232 0.118 ** -0.189 0.113 * -0.162 0.114 -0.261 0.108 **
Unknown _Iobjectiv~3 -0.096 0.177 -0.189 0.175 -0.442 0.154 *** -0.173 0.164 0.051 0.181
New business _Iobjectiv~4 -0.249 0.090 *** 0.147 0.096 0.035 0.085 -0.192 0.090 ** 0.228 0.106 **
Technology base _Iobjectiv~5 -0.288 0.169 * 0.100 0.181 -0.119 0.170 -0.443 0.166 *** 0.029 0.182
Other _Iobjectiv~6 -1.005 0.719 -0.795 0.515 -0.729 0.610 -0.560 0.418 -0.420 0.622
basic basic_pure -0.040 0.149 0.272 0.146 * 0.190 0.145 -0.160 0.138 0.502 0.157 ***
dev dev_pure 0.176 0.106 * -0.414 0.100 *** 0.068 0.102 0.373 0.114 *** -0.210 0.096 **
basic&applied b_a 0.385 0.202 * 0.791 0.198 *** 0.345 0.222 0.004 0.169 0.491 0.214 **
applied&dev a_d 0.264 0.128 ** 0.034 0.148 0.185 0.124 0.108 0.145 -0.067 0.140
basic&applied b_d -0.238 0.214 -0.287 0.314 -0.019 0.305 -0.149 0.275 -0.447 0.385
integrated integrated -0.022 0.182 0.424 0.157 *** 0.223 0.174 0.154 0.187 0.353 0.232
service service -0.065 0.152 -0.630 0.138 *** -0.282 0.132 ** 0.547 0.143 *** -0.245 0.148 *
oth_stage oth_stage -0.414 0.324 -0.818 0.386 ** -0.875 0.347 ** 1.046 0.448 ** -0.274 0.332
Process improvement _Iprodproc_2 0.089 0.146 -0.214 0.179 0.074 0.179 -0.183 0.178 0.036 0.189
New product _Iprodproc_3 0.056 0.131 0.076 0.131 0.137 0.127 0.252 0.139 * 0.133 0.143
Product improvement _Iprodproc_4 0.075 0.138 -0.256 0.160 0.170 0.146 0.041 0.143 -0.110 0.159
Other _Iprodproc_5 -0.317 0.469 0.427 0.377 -0.492 0.387 -0.696 0.364 * 0.562 0.422
number of inventors lninventors 0.353 0.064 *** 0.280 0.068 *** 0.360 0.066 *** 0.183 0.053 *** 0.176 0.062 ***
PhD PhD -0.278 0.120 ** 0.489 0.142 *** 0.490 0.121 *** 0.070 0.133 0.440 0.129 ***
Sales lnsales 0.021 0.029 0.091 0.036 ** 0.014 0.037 -0.050 0.033 0.082 0.030 ***
RD/sales rdsales 0.229 0.935 0.201 0.913 -1.920 1.084 * -4.996 1.208 *** 0.170 0.863
Patent stock ln1uspat 0.078 0.025 *** -0.030 0.033 -0.015 0.028 -0.047 0.030 -0.081 0.027 ***
control triadic patent _Itriadic_1 0.075 0.075 0.118 0.077 -0.103 0.083 0.139 0.086 0.050 0.077
Firm size  lnsales+ln1uspat 0.098 0.025 *** 0.061 0.031 ** -0.002 0.029 -0.097 0.032 *** 0.000 0.028
Note. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.    Cutoff points, dummies for application years and for US technology classes are not reported. 
Ordered logit equation for knowledge flow
Log pseudolikelihood = -3943.5194
Pseudo R2       =     0.0325






Model 1: cncpt_own Model 2:  cncpt_sci Model 3: cncpt_pat
 Number of obs   =    2754  Number of obs   =   2763  Number of obs   =  2768
Scope and stage of
research (base: applied)
Log pseudolikelihood = -4002.2582
Pseudo R2    = 0.0179
Log pseudolikelihood = -
4037.9244       Pseudo R2    =
Log pseudolikelihood = -
4031.7025                 Pseudo
Log pseudolikelihood = -4162.1467
Pseudo R2   =  0.0343
Model 4: cncpt_v Model 5:  cncpt_res
 Number of obs   =    2762
 